Barranquilla · Colombia

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THECDLE BRIEF

Health Policy · Health Systems · Medicine · Global Health

Before the earthquake: What did Colombia know about the vulnerability of its hospitals?

A magnitude 7.4 earthquake damaged hundreds of health facilities. Years earlier, the State had identified a major strengthening backlog—and required annual inventories that should show what changed before the disaster.

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The collapse of one section of Hospital Universitario del Valle (HUV) during the August 10 earthquake forced the closure of roughly 250 beds and the transfer of patients across the departmental network. The immediate question is what happened to that part of the building. The larger one is what Colombia already knew about the seismic vulnerability of hospitals, what it ordered institutions to do, and what the public record can—or still cannot—show about compliance.

According to Valle del Cauca health secretary María Cristina Lesmes, HUV’s espolón 2 collapsed during the earthquake. Pediatrics, internal medicine, and gynecology wards operated there. The hospital closed inpatient services in the affected area and other institutions made room for the patients.

But the question is not only why part of the hospital fell.

It is also what came before.

Under which seismic-safety assessments had HUV been evaluated? Which buildings or sections had been strengthened, and which had not? Who designed, contracted, executed, supervised, modified, and accepted those works? How much money was committed, and what was ultimately delivered?

There is another question behind all of them: what did the rules and preparedness plans require, and what happened in the building when the test arrived?

This is not a semantic distinction. Hospitals are expected to remain part of the response precisely when the rest of a city is under pressure.

The evidence available at the close of this review does not establish corruption or negligence. It does not show that a strengthening project failed. Nor has a public technical assessment yet established the mechanism that caused espolón 2 to collapse.

The first task is therefore narrower and more demanding: reconstruct what was known, ordered, funded, contracted, completed, and left pending—and then compare that record with what the earthquake exposed.

The problem did not begin on August 10

The earthquake had a magnitude of 7.4, an epicenter in San José del Palmar, Chocó, and a depth of 103 kilometers. The Colombian Geological Service described it as the highest-magnitude seismic event instrumentally recorded in Colombia in the twenty-first century.

The human impact was still evolving as this article was prepared. On August 16, official estimates reported by Reuters placed the toll at about 290 deaths, more than 140 people missing, and 4,200 injured. Those figures are a dated snapshot, not a final count.

What the country did not discover after the earthquake was that health infrastructure could be vulnerable.

In 2009, the Ministry of Social Protection adopted the global Safe Hospitals initiative as a national program. Four years later, Resolution 5381 of 2013 recalled that Law 400 of 1997, Law 715 of 2001, and other rules had already established duties related to earthquake-resistant construction, vulnerability evaluation, and structural intervention in health institutions.

The same 2013 resolution acknowledged that strengthening actions had been insufficient in relation to the volume of studies and works required. It extended the deadline by four years.

Eight years later, the issue remained open.

Resolution 2132 of 2021 reproduced a technical diagnosis prepared by the Ministry’s health-infrastructure unit. It covered 368 public hospital buildings classified as essential and located in areas of high or intermediate seismic hazard:

  • 17 did not require strengthening;
  • 41 had been fully strengthened;
  • 114 had been partially strengthened; and
  • 196 had received no strengthening.

The resolution stated that 84.23% still required full or partial strengthening. The category counts indicate that 310 of the 368 buildings remained in that group.

The date matters: 2021.

That percentage cannot be used as though it automatically described conditions in August 2026. In nearly five years, works may have been completed, initiated, redesigned, or abandoned, and the status of individual institutions may have changed.

But the resolution establishes something different and consequential: the problem had been identified, counted, and placed inside an administrative process.

The extensions

An extension is not evidence of wrongdoing.

Strengthening a hospital while it continues treating patients can require years of phased construction, temporary relocation of services, specialist work, and substantial funding. The Ministry relied on those constraints when it issued another extension in 2021. Resolution 2132 cited the complexity of work in operating buildings, the time needed for adaptations, limited resources, and the socioeconomic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Ministry extended the deadline for another four years, through December 19, 2024.

The explanations are in the record. What remains to be reconstructed is what the additional time produced.

If more years were necessary, it should be possible to identify which hospitals advanced, which projects began, what funds were assigned, who performed the work, and which interventions remained pending.

The question is not only why the deadline moved. It is what happened during the time the extension created.

The five missing years

The State itself established a mechanism that should help answer that question.

Resolution 2132 required departmental and district health secretariats—or the entities acting in their place—to prepare an inventory of progress on structural strengthening for health institutions classified as essential buildings. It also required those inventories to be submitted to the Ministry during the first 15 days of February each year, in the format and under the guidance defined by the Ministry.

That means an administrative sequence should exist for the annual submissions due in 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026.

It would not be reasonable to assume that every infrastructure need could necessarily be resolved within that period. It is reasonable, however, to expect the record to show which buildings remained pending, which advanced, what money was committed, which works were contracted, who executed and supervised them, and why particular projects were delayed.

At the close of this review, THE CDLE BRIEF had not located a public national consolidation capable of showing the exact status of the 368 buildings immediately before the earthquake.

That is a material limitation. It prevents this article from claiming that the 2021 backlog remained unchanged in 2026.

It also leaves a public-interest question unanswered: if annual reporting was mandatory, what do the five years of inventories show?

Finishing a contract is not the same as reducing risk

The objective of a seismic-strengthening policy is not the existence of a contract. It is a measurable reduction in vulnerability.

To determine whether that occurred, a contract title is not enough. The relevant chain includes the budget, engineering studies, design, contractor, materials, supervision, modifications, extensions, delivery records, inspections, and later maintenance.

A project can appear administratively complete while leaving unanswered what was physically done, under which technical specifications, and in which part of a larger hospital complex.

That distinction is especially important at HUV.

Espolón 2

HUV did not reach 2026 without a history of seismic-vulnerability work.

The documentary catalog of the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management contains a record for Análisis de vulnerabilidad sísmica Hospital Universitario del Valle, a 90-page study prepared in Cali by the Colombian Association for Earthquake Engineering in 1992.

The catalog record establishes that HUV’s seismic vulnerability was the subject of technical study more than three decades ago. Without the full study and later project files, it does not establish that the 1992 analysis identified a specific vulnerability in the section that collapsed in 2026.

That distinction is essential.

Lesmes also said HUV had undergone structural strengthening, but she could not say whether the affected espolón was among the areas that had been strengthened. She emphasized the age of the building and said it was likely that not every part had been strengthened.

That is why this article does not attribute the collapse to an absence of strengthening. It also does not claim that a completed intervention failed.

Before either conclusion could be supported, the record would need to establish which studies covered espolón 2, what interventions they recommended, what was contracted, what was built, and what the post-earthquake technical assessment concludes.

Several materially different scenarios remain possible. The section may never have been included in a particular project. Work may have been planned but left pending. It may have been strengthened and still suffered a failure under an extraordinary event. Or evidence may eventually show deficiencies in an intervention.

Those are not interchangeable explanations. None should be selected before the documents and engineering findings exist.

And names

It also matters who made the decisions—not to assign liability before the facts are known, but because public decisions are made through identifiable acts.

Someone approves a budget. Someone designs the intervention. Someone signs a contract. Someone performs the work. Someone supervises it. Someone accepts a modification. Someone certifies delivery.

When a vulnerability has been identified, reconstructing that chain helps distinguish between very different explanations: inadequate financing, technical constraints, administrative delay, contractual nonperformance, weak supervision, or a documented irregularity.

The word corruption requires more. It should be used only when specific conduct—misappropriation, bid-rigging, collusion, improper payment, falsification, deliberate overcharging, or another supported act—can be established with evidence.

The record reviewed for this article does not support that accusation in relation to the collapse of espolón 2.

216 affected facilities are not 216 destroyed hospitals

The Pan American Health Organization’s Natural Hazards Monitoring report for August 13 said that 216 health facilities had sustained some level of damage in the earthquake.

“Some level of damage” does not mean 216 hospitals collapsed. It does not mean 216 institutions closed. And it does not mean those facilities were the same buildings included in the Ministry’s 2021 set of 368.

The health consequence requires a distinction among structural damage, nonstructural damage, and functional loss. A hospital may remain standing and still stop operating if it loses water, electricity, medical gases, communications, or essential equipment. Another may sustain significant physical damage while preserving some services and transferring others across the network.

Valle del Cauca showed both dynamics.

In an August 16 interview with El País, Lesmes said the San Rafael hospital in El Águila was left unusable and received support from another institution and a mobile hospital. She described severe damage in Roldanillo while emergency care, operating rooms, imaging, and laboratory services remained available and hospitalization was temporarily moved to a conference hall. Other affected institutions reorganized and continued operating.

The relevant measure is therefore not only how many facilities were damaged. It is how much health-service capacity was lost, which functions were preserved, and for how long.

The network also responded

The same evidence prevents a simple story of system-wide failure.

After the partial collapse at HUV, patients were redistributed to other institutions. Lesmes said the departmental network accommodated them, treated about 1,300 people injured in the earthquake, and coordinated public and private providers, mobile facilities, and temporary reorganization of services.

Part of the infrastructure failed. Part of the network adapted.

Those are different findings, and both belong in the record.

A safe-hospitals policy cannot be assessed only by whether walls crack or a building collapses. It must also ask whether essential functions continue when capacity is lost.

Colombia had already begun to broaden its policy in that direction. Resolution 625 of 2024 adopted the international initiative Hospitals Resilient to Health Emergencies and Disasters. Resolution 2716 of 2025 then established the program’s implementation guidelines, including risk-assessment tools, evaluator training, possible financing or cofinancing, and a national information system.

The earthquake arrived only months later.

Prevention and response are not the same

The available evidence supports a distinction.

Prevention asks how much known risk was reduced before the disaster. Response asks how much essential service was maintained after the disaster occurred.

Valle del Cauca demonstrated important capacity in the second. That does not yet answer how well the country performed in the first.

For decades, Colombia had issued rules, commissioned studies, extended deadlines, and supported interventions intended to protect health infrastructure. In 2021, the official record still showed a substantial backlog. Five years later, the earthquake delivered a real-world test.

The missing piece is what happened during the interval.

The strongest contrary case

A less accusatory explanation exists and must be taken seriously.

Hospital strengthening can be technically difficult and expensive. Some facilities were built decades before current standards. Hospitals cannot simply suspend care for years while every section is rebuilt. Standards evolve, public resources are finite, and no strengthening project makes a structure indestructible.

The Ministry cited several of those reasons when extending the deadlines. In 2013, it said the work completed was insufficient relative to the scale of the need. In 2021, it added resource constraints, the difficulty of intervening in operating hospitals, and the effects of the pandemic.

The magnitude 7.4 earthquake was also an extraordinary event.

It would therefore be wrong to look at a damaged building and conclude automatically that someone acted improperly. The correct question is harder: what could reasonably have been known beforehand, what measures were required, and which were actually completed?

When the risk is already known

Knowledge changes what the public can reasonably demand.

When a study exists, a rule sets a duty, a deadline is established, responsible institutions are identifiable, and resources are assigned, the State should be able to explain what happened next.

That does not mean every delay is corruption, every extension negligence, or every damaged hospital proof of defective work.

It means something more basic: the history of a public decision should be traceable.

What was known. What was decided. What was paid. What was built. What remained pending.

Money for hospital safety should not end its public life when a contract is signed. Its result should be visible in the building—and in the services that remain available after the ground moves.

After the earthquake

For several days after a disaster, a country studies its structures. It asks why they fell, who built them, whether the rules were followed, and how much reconstruction will cost.

Then other stories arrive. The debris disappears. The headlines move on.

The risk does not.

Official documents show that Colombia knew long before August 10 that part of its health infrastructure required protection against seismic risk. They also show that interventions were made and that a substantial backlog remained in the 2021 diagnosis.

The earthquake alone does not explain why any particular vulnerability remained. It does not yet identify responsibility for the collapse of espolón 2.

But it creates a question that should survive the emergency: what happened between knowing that the problem existed and doing what was necessary to reduce it?

A rule does not protect a patient by itself. Neither does a contract.

Protection lies in the decisions that turn both into a hospital capable of functioning when it is needed most.


Methodological note

Information in this article was verified through August 16, 2026, while emergency response and damage assessments were continuing.

The 84.23% figure is quoted as published in Resolution 2132 of 2021. It applies only to the Ministry’s 2021 diagnosis and is not a confirmed percentage for August 2026. The counts in the same resolution identify 114 partially strengthened and 196 unstrengthened buildings out of 368; 310 divided by 368 produces 84.24% under conventional rounding.

Resolution 2132 required annual inventories from departmental and district health authorities. THE CDLE BRIEF did not locate a public national consolidation showing the precise pre-earthquake status of all 368 buildings.

PAHO’s figure of 216 affected health facilities refers to facilities with some level of damage. It does not mean that all were destroyed, closed, or part of the Ministry’s 2021 cohort.

The UNGRD catalog confirms the existence and bibliographic details of the 1992 HUV vulnerability study. This review did not rely on the catalog record to infer the study’s technical findings or its applicability to espolón 2.

Lesmes said HUV had previously undergone structural strengthening but could not confirm whether the affected espolón was among the areas that had been strengthened. This article therefore does not attribute the collapse to a lack or failure of strengthening and does not allege corruption, negligence, or individual responsibility without specific evidence.

The record should be updated if the 2022–2026 inventories, technical files for espolón 2, contracting and supervision records, or the post-earthquake structural assessment become public.

Editorial record

Evidence, limitations, and updates

Disclosure and limitations

Methodological limitations: emergency response and structural assessments were ongoing at the time of review. The 2021 Ministry diagnosis cannot be projected unchanged to August 2026. A public national consolidation of the annual strengthening inventories for 2022–2026 was not located. The full 1992 HUV study, the technical and contracting files specific to espolón 2, and the post-earthquake structural assessment were not available for this review. No conclusion is made about the engineering mechanism of collapse, corruption, negligence, or individual responsibility.

Funding and conflicts of interest: This article received no external funding, travel, hospitality, or institutional support. The author reports no material conflicts of interest.

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